Apple kills plans to scan for CSAM in iCloud (wired.com)

Article summary

Apple has cancelled its plan to scan iCloud photos for child sexual abuse material (CSAM) due to widespread criticism from privacy and security researchers. Instead, the company will focus on its Communication Safety features, which allow parents to opt-in to protections for their children. These features work in various Apple services to warn if someone is looking at or searching for CSAM and provide resources to report the content and seek help. Apple is also expanding its end-to-end encryption offerings for iCloud.

Main themes

• CSAM scanning
• privacy vs protection
• surveillance
• state action
• end-to-end encryption
• child safety
• corporate responsibility
• Fourth Amendment rights

What commenters say

• Mass algorithmic searches by private entities are a violation of privacy and can be used as a pretext for surveillance.
• Scanning for CSAM is a necessary measure to protect children, and companies have a responsibility to act on crimes they are aware of.
• The use of client-side scanning can be seen as a form of state action, potentially violating the Fourth Amendment.
• The prevalence of CSAM is a significant problem that requires a balance between privacy and protection.
• Surveillance is easy to abuse, and surrendering privacy can have unintended consequences.
• There are alternative methods to catch and punish CSAM producers and consumers that do not require blanket trawling of personal data.
• The distinction between state action and private action is crucial in determining the legitimacy of CSAM scanning.
• The issue of CSAM scanning is complex and requires a nuanced approach that considers both privacy and protection.